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DONALD M. WHITE and LAVINE H.
.
WHITE, husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiffs-Respondents as sellers
against Defendants-Appellants as buyers for specific performance of real estate contract, and Answer and Counterclaim for damages filed six years later by Defendants-Appellants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon Plaintiffs' motion, and after full and complete argument thereon, the lower court entered its order striking and
dismissing Defendants' answer and counterclaim and also
dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a judgment of this honorable court upholding and affirming the order of the lower court and denying the relief sought by Defendants.
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for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made
to appear the clerk shall enter his default" (emphasis added).
Nothing in the Rules allows a defaulting party such an extension of time and Plaintiffs submit that under this rule a
party, by his failure to enter default, does not extend the
time within which the adverse party may plead, particularly,
as in the instant case, when the default covers a substantial
period of time.
Defendants urge under their Point I (pages 3 and 4 of
their Brief) that the court could not properly dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint under Rule 41 (a) (2), URCP, and Defendants' counterclaim under Rule 41 (b), URCP. Plaintiffs submit that Defendants' answer was stricken and the counterclaim dismi.ssed pursuant to Plaintiffs' motion and said action was not taken under authority of Rule 41 (b). Plaintiffs
further submit that their complaint was dismissed only a.ft.er
Defendants' answer and counterclaim had been di.smissed,
and such action could properly be taken under authority of
Rule 41(a) (2).
POINT II

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS IS AUTHORIZED
BY THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE
COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR THAT MOTION
AND TO DISMISS THIS ACTION
Plaintiffs' motion is not based on estoppel, but rather was
intended to be, and was considered by the court as, a motion
to prevent Defendants, under the doctrine of estoppel by
laches, from prosecuting its claim against Plaintiffs. Argument to the court was upon this basis.

2
STATEMENT OF F.ACrs
Plaintiffs agree with Defendants' statement of facts, except to add that Defendants voluntarily gave up actual possession of the subject property after about three monhs' occupancy, and have been out of possession since that time.
Defendants have failed to comply with any of the terms of
the contract and made no demands under said contract until
the answer and counterclaim were filed in February, 1968.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR LN DISMISSING
THIS ACTION
Plaintiffs' failure to take default judgment against Defendants prior to the filing of the answer and counterclaim
does not constitute an extension by Plaintiffs of the time
within which Defendants could plead. The case cited by Defendants (Sanders v. Milford Auto Co., 62 U. 110, 218 P. 126,
cited on page 3 of Appellants' brief) is distinguishable from
and is not controlling of this case for the following reasons:
(1) the defaulting party in that case was in default for only
20 days before it filed further pleading, whereas in the in·
stant case Defendants were in default for approximately 5
years, and (2) the applicable statute in the Sanders case
provided that default judgment may be had "if no answer,
demurrer, or motion has been filed with the clerk of the
court within the time specified in the summons, or such
further time as may have been granted," etc. (Comp. Laws
Utah 1917, Section 6844) (emphasis added). That section
has been replaced by Rule 55 (a) (1), URCP, which reads
as follows: "Entry. When a party against whom a judgment
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Plaintiffs urge that under Rules 8(c) and 12(b), URCP,
the defense of laches may be asserted by motion, and need
not necessarily be asserted affirmatively by pleading, where
the delay is apparent upon the face of the pleadings. 27 Am.
Jur. 2d 721, Equity 175, and cases there cited. Also 173
A.L.R. 362 and cases there cited. Inasmuch as the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper to examine decisions
under the Federal Rules to aid in the interpretation of the
Utah Rules. Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 122 U. 487, 252 P.
2d 205.
Further, there is authority in the state courts that where
the delay is apparent upon the face of the pleadings, the defense of laches need not be especially pleaded. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Birkelund, 29 Cal. 352, 175 P. 2d 5;
Hughes v. Leonard, 66 Colo. 500, 181 P. 200.
The delays occasioned upon this case at the hands of De·
fendants have caused considerable injury and prejudice to
Plaintiffs in their case by reason of the fact that material
witnesses have died and evidence lost. Defendants claim in
their brief (page 4) that they desire to complete their pur·
chase of the property made the subject of this lawsuit. Yet
for six long years they sat by and did nothing regarding
this property: they were not in any way heard from; they
completely abandoned the subject property; they did ahso·
lutely nothing toward complying with the terms of the con·
tract; they have simply sat by and belatedly asserted their
claim after Plaintiffs, in desperation, sold the subject property to a third person, and, in in their minds, considered the
case at an end. During this time the principal Plaintiff-the
real owner of the property-and his attorney have both
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passed away, they being the only ones representing Plaintiffs who knew all the details concerning the sale and the
ensuing lawsuit. Defendants' delays have caused extremely
serious hardships upon Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, and by
reason thereof they should be precluded from asserting
their belated claim at this late date.

SUMMARY
Rule 55 (a) (1), URCP, provides that default judgment
may be entered against a party who has failed to plead or
otherwise defend "as provided by these rules". Because there
is nothing in the Rules which allows Defendants an extension
of time and because of the length of time involved in Defendants' default, Defendants' answer and counterclaim
should be disregarded and the case dismissed.
Rule 41(b) has no application to this case, and the lower
court properly entered its order dismissing the action after
Defendants' answer and counterclaim were stricken and
dismissed pursuant to Plaintiffs' motion.
Plaintiffs' motion was not based upon estoppel, but was
treated as and considered by the court as a motion to dismiss
based upon estoppel by !aches. Such defense may properly
be asserted by motion, and the court properly entered its
order of dismissal upon that basis.
The order of the lower court dismissing this action should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
John W. Palmer
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents

